Society and the Crisis of Liberalism
by Vaclav Klaus

Liberalism as a Hope for Society?

It is always fashionable to talk about a crisis. It gives those who use such terminology a special aura that they see the world more sharply than the rest of us, that they possess a noble vision of a better world, and that they know how to get there. The question is where the feeling or certainty of a crisis starts - in a deep and penetrating analysis of the status quo or in an aprioristic, elitist, and moralistic ambition? Is it merely a new fashion in thinking, an attempt to create a niche in the very competitive market of ideas or is it a real breakthrough?

At the very beginning of my talk, I must confess that I do not see around me any crisis, that I do not see any 'zerrissene Gesellschaft,' ¹ that I do not know any feasible alternative to Western liberalism, and especially that I do not believe in authoritarian, constructivistic ways to create a brave new world (of any form, color or smell). My position is based both on theoretical arguments in economics and other social sciences and on my personal experience with communism and its transformation into a free, open society we have had an opportunity to experience in the last decade. Both sources of arguments have the same importance to me.

No one would dare to claim that we are approaching paradise. There are many problems in the real world and no one should neglect or underestimate them. The only issue is how to tackle them, what to do with them. Some of us believe in individual human beings and in their motivation to better the world around them provided basic institutions of society make it possible, some believe in themselves and in the government which could realise their recommendations of what to do with the world they have ambitions to bring to perfection. We should agree with Thomas Sowell that these two approaches very clearly describe the current 'Conflict of Visions' and that the second, antiliberal vision is 'The Vision of the Anointed' (to take use of the titles of his two important books).

I strongly believe in the liberal world order. Such a world is, of course, not without preconditions. Together with Margaret Thatcher, I am convinced that 'the life of free men and women has to be a life of self-discipline, self-control and self-sacrifice' and in this respect it has to be based on an elementary moral system. At the same time I believe in the inherent morality of markets, in the ethics of work and saving, in the crucial link between freedom and private property. It is not possible (or desirable) to legislate – from above or outside – a better world.

Such way of thinking has been recently put under a new, strong and dangerous attack. The adjective 'dangerous' is appropriate because I see a virus of demagogy and romanticism in the visions of the preachers of communitarianism or a civic society as it is called in some countries. There is no identity between the two terms, but the idea of civic society (in its current, Central European meaning) has many similarities with communitarianism. And I am aware of the dangers of this idea. There was – perhaps – some justification of (or an excuse for) the idea of a civic society in the communist era when it was one of the strategies for resistance (but I had never shared this strategy). Communism is over, but the old anti-liberal ideas are still with us. They can be seen in continuous attempts to find third ways, to integrate markets with non-markets, to construct capitalism with a human face, to attack individualism (by caricaturing it), to mix genuine, spontaneously evolving associations of individuals with organisations based on obligatory membership, to disregard the crucial role of private property, etc.

Communitarianism – as I see it – represents a new version of an old anti-liberal approach to society, a shift from traditional liberal democracy to new forms of collectivism, a romantic dream and 'a constructivistic attempt of imposing the moral system of the face-to-face group on the large, anonymous society'(Radnitzky 1996), a new way of integrating society by organising it at the microlevel.²

My first argument regards the communitarian's analysis of the contemporary society. They interpret it as an egoistic, individualistic world where the basic form of social interaction takes place among atomistic units (human beings). They are supposedly alone, which means not rooted in various social institutions which would give them other than purely egoistic motives of behavior. I disagree with such interpretation of events. I do not think it reflects the prevailing atmosphere in our society. It may describe more or less pathological situation of some individuals with problems of association, but not the real world we know and live in.

There is – with all known undermining and weakening factors and influences – the family which remains to be the main foundation of our society and of our public life.

In addition to it, we are – mostly voluntarily – members of other social institutions, which brings us into contact with other people. It starts with schools, with the places we work at, with free time activities (sports clubs), etc. The more active we are, the more people we meet and collaborate with. To caricature life in the contemporary Western world as an uncooperative game (or fight) of isolated, self-centred and self-interested individuals is not justified. We should not be ashamed of self-interest because it is not true that self-interest is a motivation unworthy of human beings. In addition to it, we know – at least since Adam Smith – that society cannot rest on the noblest motives and we know as well that self-interest is the strongest motive, whether we like it or not. It does not imply that self-interest blocks our interest in other people and their well-being. In the language of economics we can say that the well-being of other people can be, and very often is, a factor in our 'utility function' (with a positive sign).

My second argument relates to communitarianism as an alternative ideology. I have already mentioned some of my arguments but I would like to repeat the two most important ones:

We are – with our communist past – oversensitive to both aspects of communitarianism.

Because of ambitions to change human beings, communitarianism is a form of elitism. Its advocates have the feeling that they have been chosen to advise, to moralise, to know better than the 'normal' people what is right or wrong, what the people should do, what will be good for them. They want us not only to be free, but to be good, just, moral as well. Of course, in their definition of what is good, just and moral. Similarly as Margaret Thatcher, I start with the assumption that liberty is an individual quality and, therefore, we should not collectivise it.

Communitarianism wants to socialise us by forcing us into artificial, not genuine, not spontaneously formed groups or groupings. In this respect, it is another version of corporatism or syndicalism, of organisations with obligatory membership which bring together people of the same profession, age, habits or interests We used to live in a 'world of obligatory memberships'. There was one tourist organisation, one organisation of pet-fans, one horse-riding club, etc. And we know what it means. For that reason, we want to be 'free to choose' (or eventually not to choose).

My third argument regards the ways how to get to the brave new world of communitarianism. One dangerous procedure how to do it is to create an intellectual climate hostile to traditional Western liberalism. This proved to be very easy to do and very efficient. After the collapse of communism, in the moment of a strange, ideological vacuum, communitarianism (and environmentalism) took their chance. They came with new arguments against our contemporary society, relied on the feeling of 'the end of ideologies' and based their tactics on people's inclination to permanently search for something new (or quasi-new).

Communitarianism cannot win through preaching only. Its preachers are here, but they cannot start a mass movement which would lead to a social revolution. Instead of it, they try to reach legislators and to legislate the world according to their dreams. And this is something I am afraid of, because we live in world of 'unconstrained' parliamentarianism. When I dare to say unconstrained I mean unconstrained by the feeling of the whole of society and of its fragility. Milton Friedman (1998) recently pointed put it crystal clear: 'We are ruled by a majority, but it is a majority composed of a coalition of minorities É No minority has an incentive to be concerned about the cumulative effects of the measures passed.' And this is very dangerous, especially when the decision-makers' and legislators' thinking is based on 'an incredible mishmash of pseudosocial science, pop-psychology, vacuous moralising, rank ideology, and political bias'(Manne 1997). It is our task to limit the introduction of systemic changes based on such aprioristic backgrounds and motivations, and instead to rely on spontaneous evolution of human institutions.

If the communitarians concentrate on founding specific institutions and on working in them, I would be on their side, But it must be done retail, not wholesale. It is necessary to do something specific, not to keep advising others what to do.

References

Friedman, Milton 1998, Two Lucky People, University of Chicago Press, Chicago.

Manne, Henry G. 1997, 'The Judiciary and Free Markets,' Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy 21(1).

Radnitzky, Gerard 1996, 'The Inconsistency of Liberal Compromises,' Journal des Economistes et des Etudes Humaines 7(4).

Wilson, James Q. 1998, Two Nations, American Enterprise Institute, Washington, D.C.

Endnotes
1. Die zerrissene Gesellschaft ('the torn society') is the title of the whole 1998 Alpach Forum.

2. Communitarianism may, however, also be a simple and much more modest empirical hypothesis that a deeper and denser network of human associations creates more of a social capital, but real communitarianism is much more.

Vaclav Klaus is a former Prime Minister of the Czech Republic. This paper is based on his address to the Alpach Forum 1998 Seminar devoted to 'Society and the Crisis of Liberalism,' 22 August 1998.

Policy is the quarterly review of The Centre for Independent Studies. For more information on subscribing to Policy, click HERE

If you are interested in the Centre's activities and publications, why not subscribe to e-PreCIS, our regular email update on the latest news and events.

(e-PreCIS requires html capable email facilities, such as Microsoft Outlook Express or Netscape Messenger)